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A NOTE ON THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 
Professor Arrow brings to his treatment of the theory of social 
welfare (I) a fine unity of mathematical rigour and insight into 
fundamental issues of social philosophy. The problem is the old one 
of the relationship of individual values to  the general well-being of 
the group. 
Arrow eschews any concept of a utility measure which could be 
validly employed in inter-personal comparison of aggregation. The 
justification for doing so lies, of course, in the fact that if such a 
measure is not operationally undefinable, a t  least it has never been 
operationally defined. In common with other theorists of the "new" 
welfare economics, Arrow must be content t o  fall back on the purely 
ordinal properties of personal preferences. 
These ordinal properties are defined by two simple axioms: 
I. Given any two alternatives, each individual can state that a par- 
ticular one of them is at least as good as the other. (If one of the 
alternatives is judged to be better than the other, it is, perforce, at 
least as good as the other. If the two alternatives are judged to be 
indifferent, each is a t  least as good as the other.) II. Given any three 
alternatives, if the first is a t  least as good as the second, and the second 
a t  least as good as the third, the individual will judge the first a t  least 
as good as the third. 
The force of these two axioms together is simply that, given any 
number of alternatives, each individual is able to arrange them in an 
array such that each alternative is a t  least as good as any that follows 
it and no better than any that preceeds it. (When the individual is 
indifferent among several alternatives, their position in the array 
vis-d-vis one another has, of course, no significance since any ar- 
rangement of them will satisfy the conditions above.) 
Arrow defines a social welfare function as a function defined on 
the system of all sets of individual arrays carrying each set of indi- 
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vidual arrays into a social array. That is, the social welfare function 
defines a rule, or method, whereby given the several orderings of 
possible alternatives made by the several individuals of a society, a 
social ordering, having the properties of the axioms, is determined. 
The alternatives, the ranking of which Arrow considers, are "social 
states" in the broadest sense of the term. Moreover, in ranking these 
alternative social states, individuals are free to  consider not only the 
amounts and kinds of services produced, the particulars of the distri- 
bution of these services among the members of the community, but 
may also consider any difference whatever that happens to  interest 
them. Thus the problem of the social welfare function is a generali- 
zation of the problem of welfare economics, including the whole 
range of social decisions in its scope. 
If nothing more is required of the social welfare function than 
what has been outlined above, the construction of social welfare 
functions is an easy matter indeed. For example, nothing has been 
said about the number of possible alternatives. If there are only two 
alternatives, the method of majority vote provides a perfectly good 
social welfare function. However, if there are more than two distinct 
social states majority vote does not necessarily work. Arrow illus- 
trates this point by his "paradox of voting": suppose there are three 
individuals (1, 2, 3) and three alternatives (X, Y, 2). Suppose the 
arrays of the individuals are 
Individual 1: X Y 2 
Individual 2: Y 2 X 
Individual 3: 2 X Y 
Now let the social welfare function be defined by the following 
rule: "for every pair of alternatives a vote is taken. That alternative 
which wins a majority shall preceed the other in the social ranking." 
A vote taken between X and Y gives a majority to  X: thus X shall 
preceed Y. A vote between Y and 2 yields a majority to Y: thus 
Y shall preceed 2. But a vote taken between X and 2 yields a majority 
to 2: and 2 shall preceed X! 
There are three obvious ways to  escape this dilemma: 1) We may 
assume that individual tastes are such that the dilemma does not 
arise; 2) We may set down an arbitrary social array of alternatives 
which is independent of any and all individual orderings; or 3) We 
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may pick out a particular individual and make the social array 
correspond to  his, to the exclusion of all other considerations. 
But I )  is to impose a priori restrictions on individual tastes, 2) is to 
impose the welfare function on society willy-nilly, and 3) is, of course, 
dictatorship. The interesting question, then, is whether a social 
welfare function can be found which is free of these objections. These 
three points and two additional ones are included in five conditions 
by which Arrow defines a “satisfactory“ social welfare function. 
These conditions are expressed with a mathematical rigour which 
need not be reproduced here. Their verbal implications are as follows. 
Condition I .  There must be three distinct social states and the social 
welfare function must produce a social ordering no matter how the 
individuals in the community severally order these three alternatives. 
Condition 2. The social orderings produced by the social welfare 
function must respond “positively“ to changes in individual values. 
That is “if one alternative . . . rises or remains still in the ordering of 
every individual.. . it rises, or a t  least does not fall in the social 
ordering.“ (p. 25) 
Condition 3. The social welfare function must be independent of 
“irrelevant alternatives.“ Suppose, for example, that individuals order 
a number of alternatives a priori and a social array of these alter- 
natives is thereby determined. Now let it be discovered that certain 
among these alternatives must be ruled out as impossible. The social 
ordering of the remaining alternatives must be unaffected by this 
discovery. 
Condition 4 .  The social welfare function must not be imposed. 
Condition 5. The social welfare function must not be dictatorial. 
The force of conditions 1, 4 and 5 should be evident from what 
has already been said. Condition 2 merely implies that, in Arrow’s 
m-ords, what we want is a welfare function, not a “social ill-fare“ 
function. The immediate force of condition 3 is merely that what 
individuals think about the impossible should not influence social 
choices made among possible alternatives. There is, however, a more 
subtle implication to condition 3 t o  which reference will be made 
later. 
It is t o  be emphasized that these five conditions provide only 
minimal “common-sense“ restrictions on the nature of the welfare 
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function. Not only are they entirely compatible with, say, a liberal 
democratic philosophy, they are, in fact, much weaker than most of 
us would be willing to agree to  as a minimum. In particular, con- 
ditions 4 and 5 do not imply that everyone must, in any sense, "count 
equally" with everyone else. In point of fact, conditions 4 and 5 
would be adequately satisfied provided only two individuals in the 
community were specified and the social ordering of alternatives 
somehow determined from their tastes alone. In other words, the 
five conditions appear to be necessary to (but not sufficient for) 
social decision processes ranging from egalitarian to something next 
t o  dictatorial. 
The breadth of possibilities adds great force to  Arrow's con- 
clusions. For mild though the five conditions may be, Arrow is able 
to  deduce a rigorous proof of his General Possibility Theorem: "If 
there are a t  least three alternatives which the members of society 
are free to order in any way, then every social welfare function 
satisfying conditions 2 and 3, and yielding a social ordering satisfying 
axioms I and I1 must be either imposed or dictatorial." (p. 59) 
The proof of the general theorem involves the concept of a "de- 
cisive" set of individuals. Arrow defines a decisive set as a set of 
individuals such that when all individuals in the set prefer some 
alternative X to  some Y, then the social welfare function indicates 
a social preference of X to Y. For example, in decision by majority 
vote any set containing a majority is a decisive set; in a dictatorship 
any set including the dictator is a decisive set, and so on. Arrow 
demonstrates, moreover, that the set of all individuals in the society 
is always a decisive set. I.e., if there is general consensus in the prefer- 
ence of X to  Y, there must always be social preference of X t o  Y. 
This fact guarantees that a t  least one decisive set always exists, no 
matter what the form of the social welfare function and no matter 
what the social decision process may be. It also implies that there 
must be at least one member in any decisive set: For if nobody thinks 
Y is a t  least as good as X then everybody must think X is better than 
Y and "everybody" is a decisive set. 
Thus for any social welfare function there must be a decisive set. 
With a finite number of individuals the total number of sub-sets is 
finite and there must exist a decisive set containing a minimum 
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number of individuals. This set must contain a t  least one individual. 
Arrow then proves that the minimum decisive set always contains at 
most one person. But then this one person is a dictator in contra- 
diction to  condition 5. 
The General Possibility Theorem (perhaps more properly called 
the General “Impossibility“ Theorem) means literally that it is futile, 
at least in the absence of an interpersonally valid utility measure, to 
seek a method of combining individual feelings into a social choice 
in satisfaction of the five weak conditions. Neither market mecha- 
nism however competitive, nor legislative processes however elabo- 
rately devised, nor indeed any procedure however simply or elegantly 
arranged will “satisfactorily“ reflect personal values in social decisions. 
At first sight this may appear as a dismal conclusion to end all 
dismal conclusions in this dismal science. On the other hand, I think 
this conclusion has been intuitively recognized by many who have 
followed the development of welfare economics in the last couple 
of decades. From this point of view the theorem has merely placed 
intuition beyond doubt. This being the usual purpose of theorems 
it is entirely welcome on that score. 
The real point, however, is that if we cannot hope for a social 
welfare function which will satisfy all five conditions, we must ask 
ourselves which of the five we are willing to  relax. Elimination of 4 
or 5 is, of course, out of the question. Similarly 2 (that the social 
welfare function should react “positively“ to  changes in individual 
tastes) is apparently inviolate. 
As we noticed earlier, however, a social welfare function can be 
defined provided we rule out those patterns of individual preference 
which give rise to  the paradox of voting. The last half of Arrow’s 
book is devoted to an excellent discussion of this matter. Arrow does 
not, however, devote a corresponding amount of attention to  con- 
dition 3 (independence of irrelevant alternatives), but merely points 
out that it is really condition 3 which stands in the way of employing 
the technique of summing ordinal individual utility indicators to 
obtain a social utility, and hence a social ordering. This fact is not 
immediately apparent in condition 3, but exhibits itself only when 
it is shown that the use of aggregate utility numbers can be made 
compatible with the other four conditions. It follows from the 
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general theorem that it must be incompatible with condition 3. This 
would suggest that some modification of condition 3, perhaps to- 
gether with a restriction imposed on utility measures might produce 
interesting results. 
In conclusion it will bear special mention that the methodology 
which Arrow employs makes his book an excellent meeting place for 
several types of mind. The mathematician o r  logician who is seeking 
new applications for his tools and new problems to conquer will 
find here an excellent example of the rigourous application of his 
methods to  an important social problem. But this is not t o  say that 
the non-mathematical social scientist will find the work a be- 
wildering maze of complicated mathematical operations. On  the 
contrary, the mathematical structure is both simple and entirely 
self-contained. Indeed the volume is admirably adapted to introduce 
the student of social science to  the rigourous application of the 
axiomatic method. Finally, those who think that exact formalization 
and mathematical thought are somehow incompatible with appreci- 
ation of the broad fundamental problems of social philosophy (and 
unfortunately there are still many who think so) will find here an 
argument to the contrary which is, I think, unanswerable. 
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